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Category Number Generators

PIN Length

Quantity

Exclude Digits

No duplicate digits within PIN All PINs unique in batch No sequential digits (e.g. 123, 876)

Keyspace —

Entropy —

Crack Time —

Strength —

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About

A 4-digit PIN has only 10,000 possible combinations. An attacker with a rate of 100 attempts/s cracks it in under 2 minutes. Extending to 6 digits raises the keyspace to 1,000,000, buying roughly 2.7 hours. This tool uses the browser's Cryptographically Secure Pseudo-Random Number Generator (CSPRNG) via crypto.getRandomValues(), the same entropy source used by TLS handshakes and key derivation functions. It never falls back to Math.random(), which relies on a deterministic PRNG unsuitable for security contexts.

The generator supports digit exclusion, duplicate avoidance within a PIN, and batch uniqueness across sets. Shannon entropy H is computed per PIN to quantify information density. Limitation: no PIN is uncrackable. This tool maximizes entropy within numeric constraints but cannot compensate for shoulder-surfing, keyloggers, or weak lockout policies on the target device.

Formulas

The total keyspace N for a numeric PIN of length L using D available digits:

N = D^L

When duplicate digits are disallowed within a single PIN, the count becomes a permutation:

N = D!(D − L)!

Shannon entropy per PIN quantifies unpredictability:

H = L ⋅ log₂(D) bits

Estimated brute-force time at attack rate R attempts/sec:

T = N2 ⋅ R

The divisor 2 reflects average-case discovery (half the keyspace). Where D = count of allowed digits (0 - 9 minus excluded), L = PIN length, R = attacker guess rate, T = expected time to crack.

Reference Data

PIN Length	Possible Combinations	Entropy (bits)	Brute Force @ 100 att/s	Brute Force @ 10,000 att/s	Common Usage
3	1,000	9.97 bits	10 sec	0.1 sec	Luggage locks, basic safes
4	10,000	13.29 bits	1.7 min	1 sec	Debit/credit cards (ISO 9564)
5	100,000	16.61 bits	16.7 min	10 sec	Some banking apps
6	1,000,000	19.93 bits	2.8 hr	1.7 min	iOS/Android lock screen
7	10,000,000	23.25 bits	27.8 hr	16.7 min	High-security vaults
8	100,000,000	26.58 bits	11.6 days	2.8 hr	Two-factor auth tokens
9	1,000,000,000	29.90 bits	115.7 days	27.8 hr	Government access codes
10	10,000,000,000	33.22 bits	3.2 years	11.6 days	Military/nuclear facilities
12	10¹²	39.86 bits	317 years	3.2 years	Ultra-secure backup codes
16	10¹⁶	53.15 bits	3.17M years	31,710 years	Theoretical max numeric key
Common Weak PINs (Top 10 most used)
4	1234, 1111, 0000, 1212, 7777, 1004, 2000, 4444, 2222, 6969 - These account for ~15% of all PINs in leaked databases.
ISO 9564 PIN Block Formats
Format 0	PIN XORed with PAN (Primary Account Number). Most common in ATM networks.
Format 1	Transaction-specific. PIN padded with random digits. Used for interchange.
Format 3	Similar to Format 0 but uses different padding. Used in EMV chip cards.
Format 4	AES-encrypted. Newest format. Supports PINs up to 12 digits.

Frequently Asked Questions

Math.random() uses a deterministic PRNG (often xorshift128+ in V8) seeded from a low-entropy source. Its output is predictable if the internal state is known. crypto.getRandomValues() draws from the operating system's entropy pool (e.g., /dev/urandom on Linux, BCryptGenRandom on Windows), which collects hardware noise, interrupt timing, and other non-deterministic sources. For security-sensitive tokens like PINs, CSPRNG is the only acceptable source per NIST SP 800-90A.

Each excluded digit reduces the available symbol set D. A standard 4-digit PIN with all 10 digits has 10,000 combinations (13.29 bits of entropy). Excluding 3 digits leaves D = 7, reducing combinations to 7⁴ = 2,401 (11.24 bits). That is a 76% reduction in keyspace. Exclude digits only when operationally required (e.g., avoiding 0 and 1 for readability on printed labels).

ISO 9564-1 specifies PINs of 4 to 12 digits, with 4 being the minimum for card transactions. EMV (chip card) specification supports up to 12 digits but most issuers default to 4 or 6. PCI PIN Security Requirements mandate encrypted PIN blocks during transmission and prohibit storing PINs in plaintext. Apple iOS and Android both support 6-digit device PINs as default, up from 4 digits in older OS versions.

For a 4-digit PIN: with duplicates allowed, N = 10⁴ = 10,000. Without duplicates, N = 10 × 9 × 8 × 7 = 5,040. That is a 49.6% reduction. However, it eliminates trivially weak PINs like 1111, 0000, 2222. The net security effect depends on whether an attacker uses dictionary attack (favoring weak PINs) or brute force. Against dictionary attacks, no-duplicate PINs may actually be harder to guess despite the smaller keyspace.

The birthday problem approximation gives the 50% collision threshold at approximately √(π/2 × N) PINs, where N is the keyspace. For 4-digit PINs (N = 10,000), collisions become likely after generating ~125 PINs. For 6-digit PINs (N = 1,000,000), the threshold is ~1,250. This tool's "unique batch" mode guarantees zero collisions within a single generation batch by tracking used values via a Set data structure.

No. By design, generated PINs are never written to localStorage or any persistent storage. They exist only in JavaScript runtime memory and the DOM. Closing the tab or refreshing the page destroys them. Only your configuration settings (length, quantity, options) are persisted. If you need to retain PINs, copy them or use the export feature before navigating away.